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Article 8

Kebbede: Losing Ground

Girma ICebbede

LOSING GROUND: LAND
IMPOVERISHMENT IN SUDAN

endowed with large expanses of arable land, estimated at 80
million hectares-the largest in Mrica. It has abundant supplies of
water. Its livestock asset (estimated at 63 million heads) is the second
largest in Mrica, surpassed only by neighboring Ethiopia. The country's
economy, hence, is almost entirely based on the agricultural sector. In 19931994, agriculture generated nearly 40 percent of the gross domestic product.
The industrial sector, which is mostly agricultural-based, accounted for about
17.5 percent of the gross national product. The agricultural sector is also the
source ofvirtually all of the country's export earnings. About four-fifths of the
labor force of the country earns its living from farming and animal husbandry.
The country, however, is increasingly impoverishing its agricultural resources
through the promotion of environmentally destructive modes of production.
In this chapter I argue that the Sudanese state has failed properly and
fairly to utilize the country's agricultural resources, and has transformed the
country into a land of poverty and degraded environment. The state greatly
undermined the security of the rural population by vastly reducing their access
to land, water supplies, grassland and wood resources in favor of ecologically
unsound large-scale agricultural schemes. These modern large-scale schemes
today control over one-half of the land under cultivation and consume nearly
all the production enhancing inputs. On the other hand, the traditional smallscale agricultural sector, which provides a livelihood for the overwhelming
majority of the rural population, controls no more than two-fifths of the total
land area under crops, much ofit ecologically beleaguered because ofoveruse.

S

UDAN IS

The Physical Environment: What Nature Has Provided
Sudan is Mrica's largest country, covering 8 percent of the entire
continent. With over 2.5 million square kilometers, it is roughly the size of
Europe or a third of the continental United States. Only eight countries in the
world are larger than Sudan. The landscape of this huge country is mostly flat
and relatively low, much ofit not exceeding 200 meters above sea level. In fact,
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much of the country is the basin of the White and the Blue Niles and their
tributaries. High altitude areas are found near the country's borders, the only
exception being the Nuba mountains located west of the White Nile. Jebel
Marra in the western part bordering Chad rises to 3,100 meters, and Over 1,760
kilometers (1,100 miles) away in the northeast are the rugged Red Sea hillsa continuous range of hills and mountains running parallel to the coast-with
elevation ranging between 700 and 2,500 meters. Toward the East, near the
border with Ethiopia, topography shifts rapidly with the escarpment of the
western Ethiopian plateau rising steeply to over 3,000 meters. Along the
southern borders are some of the most densely forested high grounds in
Sudan-Imatong and Acholi mountains, the Aloma plateau, and the Didinga
and Dongotana hills. The Imatong, at 3,187 meters, is the highest altitude in
Sudan.
The most important physical feature of the country is the Nile River
which bisects it from South to North. More than a third ofthe length ofthe river
is within Sudan and all its tributaries run most of their length within it as well.
Hence, Sudan is called the land of the Nile even though it is far less dependent
on the river than Egypt because the southern third of the country is endowed
with sufficient rainfall.
A huge shallow basin covers much of the southern part of the country.
In this basin meander indolently the Upper White Nile (Bahr el Jebel) and its
numerous tributaries that flow down from the watershed that lie between the
Nile and Zaire basins. There is an enormous swamp-locally known as elSudd-in the center of this basin, one of the most expansive in the world.
Downstream from the Sudd region the White Nile flows across the flat plains
ofSudan until it reaches Khartoum where the Blue Nile, its main tributary, joins
it.
Agro-ecological and Vegetation zones
Sudan extends latitudinally over 1,900 kilometers (1,200 miles) and in
this vast territory a series ofagro-ecological and vegetation zones, each running
west to east, can be recognized. The desert zone prevails in the northern third
of the country. The western part of this zone consists of the southeasterly
extension of the Libyan desert and the Nubian desert east of the Nile River,
extending to the Red Sea hills. The zone extends southward as far as Shendi,
approximately 16 degrees north latitude. The landscape consists primarily of
sand dunes in the west and sand and gravel in the east. The annual average
rainfall is generally less than 200 millimeters and in many areas less than half of
that amount. For instance, in Khartoum-which is located at 15 degrees
latitude outside but very close to the southern edge of this climatic zonerainfall ranges between 100 and 200 millimeters during most years. The

https://scholarworks.umass.edu/cibs/vol15/iss1/8

2

Kebbede: Losing Ground
7. Losing Ground

125

- - - - - - - - - - -

infrequent precipitation that occurs in this zone, more especially in summer,
comes from the occasional inflow of maritime tropical air masses originating
from the South and mid-Atlantic Ocean.
A vegetation cover is almost non-existent in much ofthis desert climatic
zone, especially in the western portion where precipitation is rarer. Desert
shrubs and short grasses are the dominant vegetation. Thus, much of this flat
and barren landscape, with average day temperatures of43 degrees Centigrade
(110 degrees Fahrenheit), is virtually uninhabited. Only in a few scattered oases
and along the narrow strip comprising the banks ofthe Nile River is permanent
habitation possible. Along the Nile's banks, between Khartoum and the border
with Egypt, there are small farming communities who cultivate subsistence
crops, pumping water from the river and using other traditional methods of
irrigation. Very little cultivation exists away from these banks, except along
wadis (seasonal rivers) where some isolated tribes cultivate crops for a brieftime.
Also, a small number of transhumant Arab nomadic pastoralists keep a few
camels and herds ofhardy desert sheep and goats wherever desert feed and water
are available. On the banks are also found a succession oftowns such as Shendi,
Ed Damer, Atbara, Berber, Dongola and several small villages.
The semiarid-arid zone lies approximately between 14 and 16 degrees
north latitude in the central region ofthe country but extends into the northeast
covering much ofKassala Province. At least one-fifth of the country's total area
lies in this zone. Latitudiaal variations exist within this climatic zone with
moisture availability. The northern half of this zone-adjoining the desert
climatic zone-is characterized by light rainfall, dry, warm winters, and very hot
summers. The amount and frequency of precipitation vary from year to year.
Average annual rainfall rarely exceeds 400 millimeters, and it is unreliable in
occurrence-annual fluctuations of nearly 100 percent from the mean are not
uncommon. The high rates of evaporation reduce the usefulness of even this
amount. Almost all the rain falls between June and September. The remaining
time ofthe year is virtually rainless, with the winter period being extremely dry.
Haboob (hot and dry wind) ravages this zone every year before the rainy season
arrives. During a Haboob temperatures often rise brusquely and a fine dust
blankets everything. At times when a thick fine dust fills the atmosphere, day
turns into night. The southern half of the semiarid zone and the elevated
grounds just behind the Red Sea coast (which receive winter rains in January
from the Red Sea), however, are slightly more humid, with precipitation
averaging between 400 and 550 millimeters annually. In general, much of the
semiarid climatic zone can be characterized as a zone oflong months ofextreme
heat broken by a short period ofoccasional rain, followed by cooler weather. In
terms ofnatural vegetation, this is basically an acacia-steppe grassland. Flowering plants also appear during brief rain storms. The short grasses are good for
Published by ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst, 1997
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cattle and small-stock grazing, while the trees are short and make good fodder
for camels. Nomadic pastoralists move north and south following the rains. The
Red Sea hills receive fairly adequate precipitation to support sparse nomadic
activities.
There is no permanent agriculture except on higher grounds in the
western region, along and between the White and Blue Niles, along the Atbara
River, and in the Baraka and Gash Deltas in the northeast. The Atbara River
supplies the Kashm el Girba irrigation scheme. The government established the
scheme to resettle the Nubian people who were forced to abandon their original
homes at Wadi Halfa when the construction ofthe Aswam High Dam in Egypt
flooded their land. Varieties ofcrops are grown on 330,000 feddans ofirrigated
land. The Atbara is, however, very much a seasonal river. It surges only for four
months when summer rains fall in the northwest plateau of Ethiopia. For the
rest of the year it turns into a series of puddles. The Gash Delta is flooded to a
varying degree each year during its three months flow. It provides dry season
grazing areas for the Beja (who raise cattle and camel, the latter for sale in Egypt)
and arable land for the semi-sedentary Hadendowa cultivators. The Baraka
flows from Eritrea towards the Red Sea coast and terminates south of Suakin.
It provides silt rich delta soil for crop cultivation for a brief period of the year.
In the western sandy upland areas, including the volcanic Jebel Mara region,
sedentary farming and mobile livestock raising exist in a symbiotic relationship.
Pastoralists in this region keep a mix ofherds ofcattle, sheep, goats and camels
as an adaptive strategy.
Much of the semi-arid zone has lost its natural vegetation. Acacia
species (such as A. seyal, A. mellifera, A. nubica) and grasses (such as Sorghum
purpreo-serceum, S. aethiopicum, Cymbopogon nervatus and Hyperrhenia
pseudocymbaria) used to dominate this zone. Large scale land clearance for
mechanized cultivation has greatly diminished the population of these and
several other species. Still others have been eradicated as weeds.
To the south of the semi-arid climatic zone is the savanna zone. It
covers nearly one-halfofthe country's landscape. The rainy season corresponds
with the high-sun period starting in May and ending in September. Within this
zone, there are wide variations with the amount of rainfall and duration of the
dry season. The rainfall increases appreciably from north to south and the
reliability increases likewise. The annual average rainfall ranges between 500
and 700 millimeters in the Sahel savanna, the northern region adjoining the
semi-arid zone. Here there is a pronounced dry season lasting from 7 to 9
months. Rain is unpredictable as variations between 25 percent and 50 percent
are likely. In the Sudan savanna-in the intermediate zone-the average annual
rainfall ranges between 700 and 1,000 millimeters. The dry season is 5 to 7
months long. Rainfall varies with altitude as well. For instance, because oftheir
https://scholarworks.umass.edu/cibs/vol15/iss1/8
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high altitude, Jebel Marra in the far West and Nuba mountains in the SouthCentral receive more rain than the surrounding plains. Farther south the
savanna woodland region experiences greater annual rainfall and a longer wet
season than any other part of the country. Here the average annual rainfall
ranges between 1,000 and 1,600 millimeters, with marked concentration in the
period from March to September. The highest amounts of rain fall on the
Imatong mountains bordering Uganda and on the Iron Plateau on the NileZaire watershed bordering Zaire.
The type and density of vegetation in the savanna climatic zone as a
whole vary with the amount ofprecipitation available. Where rainfall is low, tree
growth becomes bridled and grasses predominate. The vegetation in the Sahel
savanna consists of thorny shrubs, low annual grasses, scattered droughtresistant baobab trees, and acacia albida. In the intermediate savanna, tall
perennial grasses, denser acacia trees, and deciduous wood varieties are the
typical vegetation; but today it is largely deforested. However, the hill regions
of Nuba mountains and Jebel Marra have much more vegetation or woodland
than the surrounding lower areas that receive less rain. Dense, large deciduous
trees, several acacia species, and tall grasses characterize the high-precipitation
savanna region. There are areas of rainforest with many species of trees, bushes
and ferns in higher elevations such as the Dongotona and Didinga mountains,
Imatong, and the Ancholi.
The agricultural capacity and the vast livestock wealth of Sudan are
concentrated in the savanna zone. The areas of production extend from the
southern regions of Darfur and Kordofan through the vast and rich alluvial
plains along the banks of the White Nile north of Malakal and the Blue Nile
north of Roseires to Kassala Province in the east. These areas dominate the
country's economic life. With rich alluvial soil and ample irrigation available all
year round, they are considered the "breadbasket" of Sudan. In the center of
the Blue Nile Province, between the two Niles, is the Gezira, a two million
hectare (5 million acres) clay plain. It is the site ofextensive irrigation schemes,
particularly for cotton, wheat, and dura (millet) production. In the eastern
region, on the clay plains surrounding Gedaref, cereals and sesame are produced
for export on a vast acreage ofirrigated and rainfed mechanized farms. The clay
soils ofthis flat and uninterrupted region are the most productive in the country.
In Darfur and Kordofan, west ofthe White Nile, most inhabitants are sedentary
farmers dependent upon small-scale, rainfed cultivation ofstaple crops and the
collection ofgum arabic; but nearly a third ofthe population are nomads raising
camel in the North and cattle in the South. The growing season is about five to
six months long and is suitable for many rainfed crops. The South Kordofan clay
plains, especially, are suitable for such crops like dura, sesame, cotton, and
groundnuts. As a result, there exists a growing mechanized farming in this

Published by ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst, 1997

5

Contributions in Black Studies, Vol. 15 [1997], Art. 8

128

Girma Kebbede

region at the expense of the Baggara herdsmen. The Baggara are major cattle
keepers whose mobility covers a vast area in this region. In the dry season they
move to the fringes ofthe high rainfall savanna area along the Bahr el Arab and
Bahr el Ghazal rivers into Upper Nile. When the rains arrive, they move north
to central Kordofan and the Kosti area ofthe south-west Blue Nile Province to
avoid biting flies. On the Darfur plateau, seasonal water from Jebel Marra gives
good grazing. The Fur people raise cattle and cultivate crops on terraced fields.
The Transformation of Sudan's Agricultural Sector
For centuries pre-colonial traditional societies in Sudan had communal
forms ofownership ofthe means ofproduction: land, pastures, water, and other
sources vital to sustain life. Community chiefs exercised responsibilities to
apportion land and other resources to all members, settled disputes over the use
of resources, and regulated land uses and resource utilization. These community chiefs, however, sought advice and consent from their "subjects" to carry
out their communal obligations.
Within traditional societies, peasant farmers and pastoralists pursued
self-sufficient, risk-minimizing, and sustainable economies. Farmers built up
soil fertility with organic matter and extensive use of legume-based rotations
and maintained sound fallow practices. They also practiced land uses which
mixed the production ofcrops, trees and shrubs, and livestock. Trees and shrubs
not only provided sustained supplies of forage and fuelwood, but they also
replenished soil fertility as well as reduced soil erosion. Pastoralists developed
various types of sophisticated traditional methods that enabled them to
maintain sustainable land use. Mobility-governed by seasonal changes-is the
hallmark of their life. They always made sure that they moved to areas where
biological productivity was at its maximum.
All this started to change with the introduction of a new mode of
production when Sudan was brought under British rule during the last decade
of the nineteenth century. The new mode of production de-emphasized
communal ownership of resources in favor of private ownership, transformed
land into an exchange value, and geared production to external market and to
serve colonial economic interests. The colonial government imposed several
taxes, including the hut tax, the individual tax, and the livestock tax. To be able
to pay these taxes people had to produce cash crops or sell their livestock or work
on colonial farms as wage workers.
Throughout Sudan's colonial rule, the British administration encouraged the production of cotton primarily to supply this product to the textile
industries in England. Cotton was produced on the largest irrigated land in the
world-the Gezira, located between the White and Blue Nile rivers. Today, the
scheme continues to produce cotton as the principal export revenue earner. In
https://scholarworks.umass.edu/cibs/vol15/iss1/8
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recent years, as part ofa diversification program, the scheme allowed farmers to
produce wheat, sorghum, and groundnuts, and the latter has increasingly
become one of the principal export crops.
In the 1940s the British also promoted privately operated rainfed
mechanized farming. The exigency to supply the food needs ofthe Allied Forces
in Mrica during the World War II primarily prompted this policy. Most of the
land brought under this operation was arrogated from traditional peasant
farmers. The expansion oflarge-scale rainfed agriculture continued in the 195Os
and, more so, in the early years of the post-independence period. During this
period, however, discouraged by the falling world cotton prices, most mechanized farmers as well as small-scale farmers found it profitable to grow food
crops. Small-scale farmers became not only self-sufficient in food but also
produced surplus for the market. Farmers also kept grain reserves for use in time
ofdrought. Some farmers used part oftheir land for grazing to stock additional
reserve in the form of livestock. Thus, the depression of cotton prices was an
unexpected benefit that ultimately helped the country to become self-sufficient
in food. So, when drought and famine ravaged the Sahelian countries between
1968 and 1973, Sudan went relatively untouched. (Bennett, 1987: 55). In fact,
during this period Sudan was able to export substantial quantities offood crops
to Saudi Arabia and elsewhere in the Gulf region.
Sudan's agricultural development, however, underwent a major transformation since the late 1960s. The state-initiated policies which encouraged
and subsidized shifts toward large-scale, commercial, and often export-oriented
agriculture. The state opened its doors to agribusiness firms, multilateral
financial institutions, development agencies, and rich Arab governments to
promote export-oriented commodity production. Food export schemes were
vastly increased. The state expropriated thousands of acres of prime savanna
land from the farming and pastoral communities to facilitate this shift to
external markets. For instance, many traditional subsistence farmers as well as
nomadic and semi-nomadic pastoralists lost their farms and grazing lands under
the 1971 Unregistered Land Act that brought under the state's control and
ownership the so-called unoccupied lands. Wealthy citizens (mostly large
landowners, politicians, retired bureaucrats, merchants, military officers, and
traditional chiefs) and foreign investors eventually leased this land to use for
capital-intensive rainfed mechanized and irrigated farming. The World Bank
provided funding for the clearing of more than 5 million acres of nomadic
grazing land in the 1970s (Bennett, 1987: 57). The resulting shift gravely
disrupted the self-sufficient, surplus-producing, and ecologically sound peasant
and pastoral productions systems. It created conditions for the rapid decline of
the welfare of the rural population, the recurrence of drought and famine, and
widespread environmental abuse.
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The Big Schemes, Ecology, and People
The factors that have contributed to environmental abuse in Sudan are
largely of recent origin. For four decades, the agricultural policies ofsuccessive
governments in Sudan have been to maximize the production ofexport crops,
regardless of the environmental consequences of such an endeavor. The
willingness ofthe Sudanese state to pursue a 'Faustian bargain', whereby shortterm benefits are traded for long-term, unknown costs, can be demonstrated by
the building of huge dams to advance large-scale irrigation schemes, the
expansion ofmechanized farming on ecologically fragile land, the displacement
ofhundreds ofthousands ofsmall-scale traditional farmers and pastoralists, and
the increasing use of environmentally hazardous chemicals.
Large-scale Irrigation Schemes
Irrigation has been the mainstay ofSudan's agricultural development.
Irrigation is made possible by the building offour major dams: two on the Blue
Nile, one on the Atbara River, and one on the White Nile. The expansion of
irrigated schemes in the post-independence period has been a principal form of
state control over agriculture and the peasantry. All major irrigation schemes in
Sudan are state-controlled and -administered public enterprises. The Ministry
ofIrrigation and Water Resources is responsible for delivery ofirrigation water
to the major canals and, jointly with the Agricultural Corporations, for the
operation of minor canals. Irrigated lands produce over three-quarters of the
nation's export ofcotton, sorghum, and groundnuts. The country has increased
the area under irrigation five-fold since 1956.

The Gezira Scheme
The Gezira, the oldest and largest irrigation scheme in Mrica, began
operating along the Blue Nile in 1926. The British established it to provide
long-staple cotton for textile factories in England. Other crops such as wheat,
sorghum, and groundnut were also introduced at different stages of the
development of the scheme. Today, the scheme covers over 840,000 hectares,
including the Mangil and Rahad extension. The government operates the
scheme through the Sudan Gezira Board which provides administrative,
technical, credit, and marketing facilities to more than 100,000 tenant farmers.
Tenants are entitled to a standard tenancy of40 feddans which they can pass to
the next generation, but they are prohibited from transferring, selling or
mortgaging it. Even though tenants lack legal security oftenure, eviction is rare.
D nder the Gezira tenant system, the government board controls water,
plows the land, sprays pesticides, provides chemical fertilizers, decides what is
to be produced, and markets the harvested crops. Control over land use by the
government board means that a significant proportion of tenant holding must
be devoted to cotton cultivation, the principal export revenue earner. Tenant
https://scholarworks.umass.edu/cibs/vol15/iss1/8
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farmers pay for all these services and inputs. They must irrigate their own piece
ofland, maintain the canals, and weed and harvest the crops as well (Kontos,
1990: 653-654). These tasks routinely require a substantial amount oflabor
input and, hence, tenants on the scheme employ a total of a quarter million or
more seasonal workers every year.
By all accounts the Gezira scheme has failed to better the lives of the
majority ofthe 100,000 or so tenant farmers and workers. From the very outset
the scheme was intended to advance primarily the interest of the state, "to
control and deliver cotton for export" (Aricani, 1990: 217). Until a few years
ago, cotton had been Sudan's most important crop, accounting for nearly twothirds ofthe total export revenue. In spite ofpersistent fall in world market price,
the state pushed tenants to produce more ofthis commodity for ludicrously low
return. The gap between what the state paid to tenants for their produce and
the export price has always been extremely wide. The state's strict control ofall
farm decisions (including the size offarms and types ofcrops grown, the prices
and quantities ofinputs, prices ofoutputs, and timing ofoperations) prevented
tenants from allocating more land and labor to crops (sorghum and millet, for
instance) that provided good returns on the market. Tenants also suffer from
ponderous and continuing indebtedness for failing to pay for services and inputs
they are required to purchase from the state. Because incomes from the
tenancies are so low and unpredictable, many Gezira scheme tenants have to
depend on off-farm employment. A recent study showed that income form offfarm activities amounted to nearly three-fifths of the total net income of the
tenants (Hassaballa and Eltigani, 1995: 27).
In spite of the application of increasing amounts of chemicals, the
quality ofthe soil has deteriorated over time, and outputs for all the crops grown
on the scheme (cotton, wheat, groundnuts, and sorghum) have consistently
declined, while the area under cultivation has grown. * The declining soil fertility
is attributable in large part by lack of crop rotation, absence of fallow period,
improper irrigation (water-logging), poor maintenance of drainage channels,
and salt build-up. Salinization, which stems from poor irrigation management,
is especially becoming a problem in parts ofthe Gezira irrigation scheme. As the
intense heat ofthe sun evaporates the water from the farm fields, it leaves behind
the salts. Additionally, inadequate drainage has caused the water table to rise,

•Total acreage for sorghum increased from 3 million hectares in 1979 to 6.2 million in 1994.
But the yield declined from 725 kg/ha to 561 kg/ha during the same period. Millet's acreage
increased from I million ha to 2.3 million; yield declined from 394 kg/ha to 268 kg/ha. For
groundnuts, the acreage increased from 0.9 million ha to 1.1 million; yield declined slightly
from 792 kg/ha to 742 kg/ha. Acreage for cotton was drastically reduced from 332,000 ha
in 1979 to 147,000 ha in 1984. Cotton's yield declined as well, from 490 kg/ha to 363 kg/
ha during the same period.
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bringing salt water into contact with crop roots, which kills them. Cropping
intensity has dropped to less than 60 percent as over 100,000 hectares were
taken out of production due to siltation and mismanagement of the irrigation
canals, resulting in reduced availability ofwater. Local agricultural experts fear
that unless more efficient water management system is in place, much ofthe land
currently under cultivation will either suffer greatly reduced productivity or go
totally out of production.
Ill-health and premature death are major problems in much of rural
Sudan. Whereas this is largely attributable to the poverty of rural living
conditions, large-scale irrigation farming schemes are increasingly responsible
for the deteriorating health conditions of farmers and seasonal laborers. For
instance, irrigation-related diseases such as malaria and bilharzia are widespread
in the Gezira districts ofEI Managil, EI Hasaheisa, El Mehiriba, EI Mielig, and
Rufaa. The Gezira as a whole has a high rate ofincidence ofmalaria and bilharzia
because ofthe presence ofmany irrigation canals that provide breeding grounds
for snails which host bilharzia vectors and malaria-carrying mosquitoes. Malaria
cases tripled and bilharzia cases nearly doubled within a ten-year period (Berry,
1983: 105). Other water-borne diseases such as typhoid, leptsopirosis and
amoebiasis are becoming more prevalent than before as well.
The use of pesticides and chemical fertilizers has also become a major
health hazard for the inhabitants living in and around the Gezira Scheme. Sudan
is one of the largest pesticide users in Africa. Large-scale agricultural schemes
routinely use pesticides to control pest infestation and herbicides to control
weeds. Sudan applies many different types of chemicals to control pest
infestation six times a year (Prendergast, 1989: 52). The Gezira scheme has
been using pesticide since the 1940s. The amount of pesticides applied on this
and other mechanized agricultural schemes elsewhere in the country has
steadily increased over the years, reaching 2,500 tons a year in the late 1990s
(Adams, 1992: 119). Most of the pesticides are applied to cotton plantations,
with an area ranging between 220,000 and 300,000 hectares annually (Dinham,
1993: 70). Despite this effort and the increasing cost ofpesticides, crops losses
to pests continue.
Pesticides and herbicides are sprayed by aircraft. Aerial spraying is
frequently carried out with little or no regard for the inhabitants living close to
large farm schemes, to crops these people produce, and to non-target areas such
as rivers, dams, and other water sources. As a consequence, irrigation canals are
contaminated, the fish population has declined, and the pest population has
built up genetic resistance.
Banned or obsolete pesticides and inappropriate disposal of used
pesticide containers have become health hazards to communities around major
large-scale agricultural production. In 1987, a Sudanese research group iden-
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tified a number ofsites where old and banned pesticides stored for several years
have "corroded, spilled out and been washed down with heavy seasonal rain to
pollute surrounding water ponds which are used by domestic animals and in
some household utilities" (El Gadi, 1991: 3-4; Dinham, 1993: 54). The
research group's extensive interview with residents ofHasahissa, located in the
middle of a populated region, and the Gezira irrigation schemes, found a high
incidence of headaches, nausea and dizziness, skin hypersensitivity, loss of
appetite, running nose and sinusitis, and sore and stinging eyes. The study also
noted the intoxication of birds, fish, cattle and wildlife during the pesticides
spraying season, and incidents involving the death of many domestic animals
(Dinham, 1993: 54).

Irrigation Schemes on the White Nile
Along the middle course of the White Nile between Khartoum and
Kosti, there are several state-operated pump irrigation schemes, each operating
50,000 or more feddans ofland. There are also many privately owned schemes
with lesser farm sizes. The total area under current cultivation is well over half
a million feddans ofland (Sin, 1995: 17). Builtin 1937, the Jebel al-Awliya Dam
controls to a large extent the level ofwater supporting the schemes. Cotton, of
course, is the main product of these schemes with sorghum, fruits, vegetables,
and spices grown as secondary crops.
Prior to the construction of the dam, people used the clay plains of the
river valley and the upland areas productively without abuse. During the dry
season they pastured their cattle and cultivated crops on the land along the
White Nile. Small-scale irrigation farming, using the traditional shadufor sagia)
was also practiced. During the summer season, when the valley was flooded,
people moved to the upland to graze their cattle and grow rainfed crops.
Throughout the river valley, crop rotation and a transhumant mode oflivestock
rearing prevailed in a symbiotic relationship for several generations. As Horowitz
and Salem-Murdock (1987: 107) have noted: "In the market, pastoral produce
(milk and milk products, live animals, meat, and hides) was exchanged for cereal
grains; on the cultivated fields, crop stubble was exchanged for manure, as the
harvested farms constituted an important source of dry season fodder."
With the building of the dam, a vast amount of the riverine land was
flooded and people lost access to grazing and cultivable land. The expansion of
irrigated schemes further reduced the traditional grazing area, particularly the
dry-season grazing land close to the river, forcing herders to graze their animals
on the semi-arid range for the whole year. Thus the concentration of grazing
and farming in upland areas, along with increased human and cattle population,
inevitably led to permanent land degradation (Horowitz and Salem-Murdock,
1987: 97-98).
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With diminishing grazing land came increased use of vegetation for
cattle fodder, thus competing with the need for fuelwood. Decreased farmland
also led to wholesale removal of trees to make room for cultivation. The
environmental consequences of the removal of the natural vegetation are
several: the lowering of the net photosynthesis rate, the reduction in the
accumulation of biomasses, the reduction of food for domestic and wild
animals, the disruption of the energy, nutrient, and hydrologic cycles, the
reduction ofnitrogen fixation and nutrient and moisture availability in the soil,
an increase in soil erosion via water and wind agents, and an overall decrease in
the biological productivity of the land (Whitney, 1987: 132-133).

The New Haifa Scheme
Similar ecological disruptions have taken place in the New Haifa
Scheme in the East. Also known as Kashm el Girba, this irrigation scheme is a
large-scale project (330,000 feddans in 1993) along the western bank of the
Atbara River. The scheme was established in 1965 for the settlement of
Sudanese Nubians whose Wadi Haifa lands and communities were inundated
by the Aswam Dam reservoir in southern Egypt. Prior to the construction ofthe
Kashm el Girba dam, the lower Atbara economy was predominantly agricultural, mainly dependent on irrigation from the Atbara River. The inhabitants of
the area led a self-sufficient subsistence economy practicing various types of
river-based cultivation: Gerfcultivation on the river bank (flood irrigation);
Karu cultivation which makes use of irrigation by means of pumps and water
wheels; Magat cultivation of the river bed when the river water recedes and
develops into pools; and Atmur rainfed cultivation in some parts of the Atbara
basin (Ati, 1992: 24). Cattle raising, fishing, and wood collection were also
pursued as supplementary economic activities. Indigenous pastoralists such as
the Shukriya and Hadandawi grazed their cattle on the plains and riverine
pasture. They pursued a mode of production compatible with the natural
resources and constraints of the semiarid nature of the region.
The impact of the dam on the downstream economy has been
significant: 1) a severe drop in the amount of water flowing downstream, 2)
erosion of the river channel as coarse and dissolved materials were deposited
behind the dam, 3) reduced fertility of the riverine soils as the annual flow of
silt decreased, 4) increased deforestation due to decreased annual river-drifted
wood downstream, 5) increased overgrazing due to loss ofthe riverine pasture,
and 6) disturbance of the feeding and breeding system of the fish population
(Ati, 1992: 29-31). The ecological and human effects of the reservoir itself are
the loss of upstream terrestrial ecosystems and the displacement of tens of
thousands of farming and pastoral communities.
Increasing sedimentation ofthe Kashm el Girba reservoir and irrigation
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systems has also become a major problem. This problem has been linked to land
clearing for agriculture and degradation of watersheds. The reservoir was
estimated to be 55 percent full of silt in 1983, after only about 20 years of
operation (Lewis and Berry, 1988: 184). According to recent finding the
storage capacity of the reservoir was "reduced due to silting from 1,300 million
cubic meters to 718 million cubic meters by 1976 and is expected to reach 500
million cubic meters in 1997" (EI-Ashry and Ram, 1987: 90). At the current
rate ofsilt accumulation, there will be little water for irrigation by 2025 (Adams,
1992: 132). At present, because the reservoir provides much less irrigation
water than in the past, much less land is being cultivated. Salinization is
beginning to become a problem in some areas of the irrigation scheme.

The Expansion ofRainfed Mechanized Farming
The 1970s in Sudan saw the spread oflarge-scale mechanized farming
into the savanna plains of the central rainland areas of the Blue Nile province,
eastward to the vast flat plains ofButana in Kassala Province, and westward into
southern Kordofan and Darfur provinces. In 1973, for instance, with loans
obtained from the World Bank, 200,000 feddans of the most fertile land in
southern Kordofan was turned into public and privately operated mechanized
farming schemes (Ahmed, 1983: 55). A wealthy Saudi Prince obtained a 99year lease on 1.1 million feddans offertile land in Blue Nile Province to produce
sorghum to feed animals in the oil-rich nations (Prendergast, 1990: 41). The
total area under mechanized rainfed farming increased from slightly over one
million feddansin 1968 (Suliman, 1993: 105) to over 7 million feddans in 1989
(Sin, 1995: 17). On average, mechanized farmers cultivate 3,500 feddans each,
but there are some who farm between 10,000 and 35,000 feddans (UNHCR
and ILO, 1984: 5). In 1987, there were 3,500 large-scale farmers who
cultivated as much land as all the small-scale traditional farmers combined
(Shaddad, 1987: 33). The expansion of mechanized farms depended on
expensive imports of fuel, machinery, chemical fertilizers, and other goods.
These inputs consumed much ofthe hard currency earning ofthe country. This
in turn led to an increase in borrowing to pay for these imports.
Mechanized farming became the most profitable agribusiness for
foreign and wealthy local investors with little or no interest in sustainable land
management. First, investors leased land from the state at bargain prices.
Second, they obtained farm equipment and imported inputs at subsidized
prices. Third, they obtained loans from the state bank at low interest rates.
Fourth, they were permitted to lease fresh land after they exhausted soil fertility.
Fifth, they pursued monocropping, ignoring state regulations requiring fallowing and crop rotation to ensure soil fertility. Sixth, some scheme operators sold,
rented or sharecropped the land they leased from the state. Seventh, they hired
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seasonal labor at extremely low wages. In most instances, the machine does the
ploughing and seeding. Cheap labor does the land clearance, planting, weeding, and harvesting.
The mechanized agricultural sector produced the bulk of the export
commodities. However, the small-scale peasant sector slowly felt pressured to
get involved in export commodity production. Increase peasant involvement in
export commodity production has been brought about "by soaring rates of
direct taxation, scarcity of consumption goods produced by the subsistence
sector, and intensified commercial trade in the products of both mechanized
agricultural schemes and nomadic communities" (Prendergast, 1990: 36).
Competition from large-scale mechanized farming sectors has forced
small-scale cultivators in rainfed areas in the eastern region to look for other
sources ofincome. Today, a large number ofsmall-scale farmers are involved in
wage labor working on large-scale farms or irrigated schemes. Many also engage
in non-farming activities such as trading, hand-crafting, and wage laboring in
nearby urban centers.
From an environmental and social point of view, the expansion of
rainfed mechanized farming in eastern Sudan has produced disastrous results,
some of which include the following.
1. Mechanized farming expanded by cutting down nearly all the natural
vegetation in the area. In the past, tall grasses, flat-topped acacia trees,
the drought-resistant baobab trees, bushes and shrubs were dominant
vegetation in the clay soil plains ofsouthern Kordofan, southern Darfur
and eastern Sudan that have now turned into large mechanized farms.
In the wetter southern parts of these regions, dense forests of tall trees
were common features of the landscape not long ago. All these forests
have almost disappeared in the last thirty years or so. Grasses and shrubs
have also gone, and during the dry season the soil in this vast region is
exposed to intense wind erosion. In 1970s alone, an average of8,750
square kilometers of forest were removed annually to make room for
mechanized cultivation (Government of Sudan, 1982: 53; Berry and
Geistfeld, 1983: 69).
2. Efforts to grow the same crop on the same field each year provided
neither rest for the land nor opportunities for the land to regenerate its
fertility. Once the land is exhausted and yields start to decline,
abandonment of the land for neighboring new areas follows, destroying once again vegetation cover, especially perennial vegetation, and,
in turn, leading to a rapid loss oftopsoil by erosion. Soil erosion has also
taken a toll in the region, owing largely to the widespread use of
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tractors. Today, the topsoil on much of the abandoned land in the
eastern region has been destroyed to the point of sharply lowered
productivity.
3. The expansion occurred at the expense ofthe traditional farmers and
nomadic pastoralists; the government forcefully drove them out of
their well-endowed farmlands and pastures. The transformation ofthis
intermediate zone into modern mechanized farms pushed pastoralists
to more marginal lands and blocked their traditional seasonal movements between the semiarid-arid land ofthe North and the savanna of
the South. With less land available, farmers intensified their use of the
land, neglecting the traditional land use practices such as fallowing and
crop rotation-which ensured the recuperation of soil fertility-thus
leading to further environmental degradation. As the productivity of
the land decreased and land impoverishment increased, farmers and
pastoralists were unable to generate sufficient income to meet their
basic necessities. As a result, many moved to marginal and increasingly
inhospitable areas or became farm laborers or migrated to urban areas
to seek employment. Those pastoralists who were driven out of their
traditional grazing lands are wrongly blamed for the degradation ofthe
marginal ecological zone they are now forced to inhabit and for the
encroachment ofthe desert, estimated at about 10 kilometers per year.
One of the most glaring incidents of wholesale clearing of
vegetation, induced by the expansion of mechanized farming and state
pricing policies, is the fast decline of the Acacia senegal, the tree that
produces gum arabic, an important export crop ofSudan, which is used
for pharmaceuticals, printing, and food preparation. In western Sudan,
the tree is a crucial part of a crop rotation because, as a leguminous
plant, it fixes nitrogen from the air into the soil as a fertilizer, gives
shade, and helps prevent soil erosion. The leaves are used as cattle
fodder and older trees are felled and used for firewood. Over the past
several years, however, the cultivation of gum arabic trees has vastly
declined due to (1) pressures on land from displaced farmers and
pastoralists as rainfed mechanized cultivation expanded, (2) the decline
of gum arabic returns to small farmers resulting from low government
prices and farmers opting to grow other crops such as millet and
sorghum as alternatives, and 3) increased fuelwood demand. The
decline of the gum arabic trees accelerated during the droughts of the
early 1980s as farmers made three times as much money by turning
their gum arabic trees into charcoal for sale as fuel, than by harvesting
the gum (Carter, 1986: 10). Economic necessities continue to force
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people to engage in wholesale destruction of these environmentally
useful trees, after having exploited them prudently for many centuries.
4. The continuing expansion of large-scale mechanized farming has
also ruined the symbiotic relations that had existed for centuries
between the farming population and the nomadic pastoralists. Both
communities depended on one another for their livelihood through the
exchange ofeach other's produce. Also, historically pastoralists moved
to areas inhabited by sedentary farmers after the latter had harvested
their crops. While the pastoralists benefited from access to grazing
pastures, their cattle also enriched the farmers' land with their organic
waste. Frequent tensions and conflicts between the two communities
have now become the norm as both have to scramble for scarce and ever
diminishing cultivable land and fresh grazing land. The conflict usually
arises when pastoralists move their herds into farmers' cropped fields in
search of pasture, often destroying maturing crops. Violent conflicts
overland have become more frequent, particularlyin Southern Kordofan,
Upper Nile, Blue Nile, and White Nile Provinces (Prendergast, 1989:
45).
The dilemma for the pastoralists is that their livestock population steadily increased at the same time as large-scale irrigation and
mechanized schemes have cut into traditional grazing areas. The
domesticated animal population (dominated cattle, sheep, goats, and
camels) of the country increased from about 33 million in 1970
(Ministry ofInformation and Culture, 1971: 131) to 57 million in
1983 to over 63 million in 1993 (Amanor, 1996: 911). The number
would have been considerably higher had the drought of 1983-85 and
1990-91 not significantly depleted stocks. The relatively high rate of
livestock growth can be attributed largely to improvements in veterinary services, wider provision ofbore-holes for year-round grazing, and
the traditional values which attach one's well-being and prestige to the
possession of large herds, regardless of the quality of animals.
World Bank-supported government plans to permanently
settle nomadic or semi-nomadic groups around reservoirs and waterholes may have solved the short-term water and grazing needs of their
livestock, but have, unfortunately, resulted in excessive degradation of
range land. Areas where water-holes induced "permanent" settlement
have been over-grazed to the point where all the natural cover is
destroyed, exposing the topsoil to water and wind erosion. Wind
erosion is particularly severe in the semi-arid and savanna grazing lands
of Sudan.
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5. The loss ofwoodlands has also led to the almost total disappearance
ofwildlife in most parts of northern Sudan. Land clearance for rainfed
mechanized farming and irrigation, especially, has expanded by virtually eliminating animal habitats. Additionally, large increases in human
and cattle populations, removal ofvegetation for fuel, and hunting have
deprived most ofthe semi-arid and savanna zones ofthe country oftheir
wildlife (Davis, 1987: 190). Many people in the savanna woodlands of
the eastern region recall the existence of such primates as the zebra,
giraffe and elephant only about two or three decades ago. They say
none exist today.
Pushing Environmental Destruction Southward
In the last two decades or so, the government has also been engaged
in pushing environmental destruction southward. For instance, the government's
construction a 360-kilometer long and 54 meters wide canal between Jonglei
and Malakal-bypassing the swamps of the Sudd (the largest freshwater swamp
in the world) in southern Sudan, is expected to result in deleterious environmental consequences. Those in favor of the Jonglei Canal argue that the canal
will enable the South to irrigate the fertile land to be reclaimed from the Sudd.
The South will also benefit from improved water and land transportation (Lako,
1992: 45). Others also contend that water diversion around the Sudd will not
significantly alter the existing ecosystems since much of the Nile's water will
continue to flow through the Sudd. (Lewis and Berry, 1988: 337). Environmentalists, however, point out that draining the Sudd would force the
inhabitants of the region to alter their way oflife. The livelihood of the Dinka,
Nuer, Shilluk, and many others in the Sudd region depend on cattle raising,
agriculture, and fishing, and their whole existence is adaptive to the regime of
the river with periodic movements back and forth across the river. The Sudd
provides a good dry-season pasture from November to April. The excavation of
the Jonglei canal would destroy an estimated 40-50 percent of this pasture
(Burton, 1991: 515). The Sudd provides a productive breeding ground for a
great many variety of fish and game, an important supplementary diet for the
local inhabitants. It is also home to millions of migratory birds and thousands
oflarge herbivores (Howell, et aI., 1988: 464). The construction of the canal
would mean that the people and wildlife living in the areas of the project would
have much less water anJ a diminished habitat. There would also be serious
problems of access across the canal for pastoralists. In 1983, the SPLM/A
forced a halt to the construction of the canal, with about two-thirds of the
project completed.
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CONCLUSION
This paper has argued that environmental and natural resource degradation has been driven primarily by state policies that have pushed the expansion
of agricultural exports and massive land alienation. Agricultural development
projects such as irrigated and rainfed schemes have not only reduced the
productivity of the land as a result of inappropriate land use practices (for
example, monocropping), but also forced a vast number ofpeasant farmers and
pastoralists to move into marginal lands and engage in ecologically destructive
practices. The damage done to the land's ability to sustain life in many parts of
the semi-arid and savanna regions ofSudan is extremely extensive. Some areas,
which once supported tens of thousands oflives, are now barren, and the land
is totally degraded and incapable of supporting flora and fauna.
Clearly, the decline in the well-being of the Sudanese people and their
means of livelihood dictates that development as usual cannot continue.
Successful development depends on the sustainable use of environmental
resources and on minimizing, as far as possible, the negative impacts resulting
from the extraction of resources. This cannot be realized without ending the
impoverishment of the rural producer, which leads to the impoverishment of
both the rural economy and natural environment. Ending this impoverishment
requires the state's transfer ofagricultural resources back into the hands ofthose
whose survival directly depends upon their prudent management, the restoration of traditional knowledge and systems of land use that have proved
environmentally appropriate, and the supporting of peasant farmers and
pastoralists in their endeavor to rehabilitate their degraded environment. The
obstacles to achieving such a transformation in state policies towards community-based resource management and development strategy, however, should
not be underestimated. The empowerment ofthe rural masses and the transfer
of resources back to local communities will undoubtedly be opposed by those
who benefit from the prevailing strategies of development. The hope is that
formidable industrial and agricultural trade unions, peasant organizations, local
non-governmental organizations and grass-roots pressure groups will emerge
to force those in political power to embark on a development strategy that is
socially and economically just, politically empowering, and ecologically sustainable.
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